Federalism and cultural pluralism : the Canadian experience by Brown-John, C. Lloyd & Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. Barcelona, Catalunya
Federalism and Cultural Pluralism:
The Canadian Experience
C. Lloyd BROWN-JOHN
University of Windsor, Ontario
Working Paper n.106
Barcelona 1995
INTRODUCTION
Canada is now, and always has been, a culturally plural land. Long before
Europeans arrived to colonise and settle the vast upper portion of the North
American continent peoples of diverse cultures reamed the land. The names of
great European explorers and adventurers washed upon the coastal shores of
North America -the Genoese explorer John Cabot sailing under and English flag
in 1497; Gaspar and Michael Cort-Real from Portugal in 1500; Alvaraez
Fagundes of Portugal in 1521; John Rut from England in 1527; Estevan Gomez
also of Portugal in 1524-25 and finally, Jacques Cartier for France in 1534 and
1535. The Corte-Real brothers were the first to explore the waters of Canada’s
arctic and the first to sight those people who Europeans later called "Eskimo" or
what today we more correctly call "Inu" or "Inuit".
What the great 15th and 16th Century explorers could neither have known
nor have understood is that while they looked upon the land as often barren and
inhospitable there were, indeed, cultures and peoples who had inhabited that land
for centuries. The territory which now comprises "Canada" encompassed no
fewer than 12 linguistic groups, some sixty distinct tribal communities and literally
hundreds of tribal bands1. What Europeans assumed to be primitive savages
("noble savages" if one believes Jean Jacques Rousseau!) were diverse peoples
and cultures co-habiting in some form of regularised relationship their physical
environment. Forms of governance existed and social orders prevailed. But,
because they did not comply with the European view of "civilisation", the recent
arrivals on the continent set about changing and often eliminating the host
cultures. It is ironic today that the very process launched in the 16th Century by
Europeans continues as new groups of "explorers" and "settlers" arrive in
Canada. Today, however, the inhabitants are able to voice their concerns and
they are often able to argue that existing cultures are in danger of being
submerged by the arrival of new and foreign cultures. Canada’s original native
inhabitants were not so able to resist the tidel-wave of cultural change and, in
consequence, they were submerged and often disappeared.
It is possible to imagine that 100 or more years form now the fundamental
languages not only of Canada but of North America in general will be entirely
different than they are today. Indeed, a vast influx of persons from Hong Kong
into the west coast city of Vancouver already is altering the cultural environment
of that community. In turn, however, such immigration from non-traditional
sources has evoked a widespread reaction in Canada and has led to a recent re-
definition of qualifications for immigrant status. Fear that existing cultures will be
irrevocably altered and even submerged are substantial motivators for much of
the debate which surrounds relationships between the two "founding"
communities in Canada.
CANADA´S FOUNDING COMMUNITIES
It is an historic irony today that in the contemporary contest between the
two founding European cultures in Canada that those who originally, were termed
"Canadians" (as a mode of distinguising them from the 'conquering British' and
who, when dignity once more began to flourish, called themselves "Canadiens")
have chosen to pursue another identity "Quebecois". Of course, I shall argue, as
many have before, that the two terms are not incompatible. After all, most of us
are capable of simultaneously identifying with cultures and concomitant symbols
of state at several levels. Thus, today, to be a fervant Quebecois need not be an
assumption that one has also precluded being a fervant Canadian.
As J.R.Miller (1975;63) has suggested, form Confederation in 1867
Canada never was intended to be anything else but a "political entity". Uniformity,
"...would have proved impossible of attainment. The various [British] colonies,
with their unique historical development, their different religious denominations,
and their distinct nationalities, could not have been homogenized culturally as
they were joined politically. The peculiarities of language, creed, and regional
identity had to be maintained, for several good and compelling reasons".
Miller adds:
"Even if it were possible to assimilate all British North Americans, to what would
your assimilate them?...Canadian unity was not purchased at the price of
homogenization because the colonial politicians who produced it had no intention
of creating problems for themselves by debating something as abstract and
theoretical as the cultural basis of the new state".
Yet, while political wagering and compromise characterised the confederal
and/or federal settlement recorded in the original Canadian constitution of 1867 -
The British North America Act- issues of culture were deep and subtley pervasive.
Canada’s two founding European cultures were French and British -the
latter being a blend of English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish2. Historically these two
cultures had entwined on many occasions from the days of Caesar and Romans
to William the Conqueror in 1066 and Edward IV’s invasion of France in 14753
and, of course, the Seven Years War which led to the capture of New France by
the British and its cession to the British Empire by the 1763 Treaty of Paris.
A British Proclamation of 1763 which, among other things, limited the
territorial size of New France -renamed Quebec- in an attempt to assimilate the
newly conquered peoples and encourage settlement by British immigrants largely
failed in its intent. Consequently, in 1774 in a document known as The Quebec
Act, the British restored French civil war, the seigneurial system and, established
Catholicism (for the first time ever in a British territory) as a religion with
acknowledged status. The right of the Church to collect the tithe was also
ensured. I do not propose to enter into the debate over who dominated whom in
late 18th and early 19th century Quebec4. What I do wish to suggest, however, is
that rather imperceptibly and irrevocably the cultural identities of both
francophone communities in Canada (Quebec and les acadiennes5) persisted -
albeit that of Quebec with great presence.
It is important to appreciate this persistence of the francophone cultural
identity in Canada over the difficult century after the 1763 conquest6. The
conquest had been tenuous and the 1774 Quebec Act was unashamedly an
attempt to ensure that the French inhabitants of the newly acquired territory did
not join the burgeoning revolt in American colonies. Whether the British flattered
themselves with the belief that the inhabitants of the new colony remained
passive during the American invasion due to enlightend colonial policy or, simply
due to indifference is not certain. What is certain, however, is that for the next 70
years assimilation was the operational premise of British colonial governance.
What is equally certain, however, is that les canadiennes learned the intricacies
of the British constitution much more rapidly than the British had anticipated
(Igartua, 1974). Employing British political institutions, les canadiennes
(especially of the mercantile class), sought to expand their own control over laws
and institutions in accordance with French law and tradition.
In summary, the very nature of linguistic and cultural protections assured
French speaking. Canadians, especially after the Constitution Act of 1791 when
they participated in colonial government, ensured that la survivance of the
francophone fact in North America would have a substantial political dimension.
In a war with the Americans (1812-1814) many francophones rendered service to
British in return for land grants. Their loyalty was demonstrated and there was no
turning back as 1837 uprisings in both "Upper" (Ontario) and "Lower" (Quebec), in
support of representative government, suggested. The francophone political fact
was clearly in play in Canada after 1841 and The Act of Union7. Thus, in the 25
years thereafter, leading up to the 1867 federation of the four North American
British colonies as "Canada", the imperative of cultural and linguistic survival had
been converted into an effective political presence.
The constitutional agreement of 1865 which led to the final British North
America Act in 1867 was, for all practical purposes, a political conclusion among
two diverse linguistic and religiously premised communities. Canada was a
political compromise. It was not a country founded on high purpose and with
stunning constitutional declarations- Unlike the Americans, the Canadian
constitutional drafters produced an archaic document -premised upon theories of
British constitutional practise already out-dated in 18678.
The concept, therefore, that the 1867 federal relationship in Canada was a
political compromise between two "founding" races holds considerable substance.
That concept is extremely important in understanding events which have
transpired in the 128 years since that political agreement. McRoberts and
Postgate (1980;32) have observed:
"For French Canada, the real benefit of Confederation [in 1867] was the provision
of a range of powers, limited but sacrosanct, over its own affair...[Quebec
became] a concrete political unit, protected by the Constitution, in which the
French Canadian community could be clearly dominant and thus have a chance
to survive on its own terms".
But, they also note that:
"French Canadians were relegated to the position of a permanent minority where
their rights and powers were subject to the actions of the Anglo-Canadian
majority".
For French speaking Canadians, especially those in Quebec, the Canadian
Constitution was a permanent political agreement whereby the minority
francophone community would garner not only internal self-determination but
assurances that their minority status -not only in Canada but continentally- would
be protected9. Reflecting upon this, Alain Gagnon (1989;147) has noted that "the
Canadian system has been successful, not so much in resolving conflict, as in
managing it, and striking a flexible balance between the divergent views of the
initial bargain". The Quebec’s fears that their language, religion and culture would
be abused was borne out in the years after the 1867 'Confederation' (federal)
agreement10. Since 1867, the dominant political issue in Canada has been the
nature of the fundamental bargain between the two founding communities.
Fears that the original bargain is threatened combined with some rather
romantic notions about maturing "nationhood" provide much of the impetus for the
contemporary debate over culture and politics in Canada.
NOTES ON THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Latent and overt separatism have been part of Quebec nationalism
certainly for most of the 20th Century. Arguments have taken many forms but one
overwhelming characteristic of much of the discussion has been a sense of
romanticism tinged with fear of what some neo-nationalists describe as "cultural
genocide".
The romanticism of neo-nationalism in Quebec is premised upon
assumptions both about the maturation of a people and the role independence
would play in establishing the identity of those people. It is a style of nationalism
characteristic of many other nationalist movements and it lends itself well to
political manipulation, for like a religion, nationalism plays upon the sentiments
often at the expense of reason and common sense.
Sovereignty is seen as a natural process -"we can see the Quebec nation
transform itself from a fragile bud to a superb flower opening up to the world"
(Lagassé, 1992). An holistic perception of a collectivity, saved from assimilation,
now moving forward with hightened political consciousness and a sense of
"nation". For some of the extreme nationalists Quebec sits precariously perched
on the brink of annihilation "maintenant ou jamais" screams the title of Pierre
Bourgault’s (1990) challenge; "Gouverner ou disparaître" is the warning of one
Pierre Valdeboncoeur (in 1976 he was also writing of genocide).
Other neo-nationalists see Quebec as strong and far from disappearing
(Latouche, 1990). Latouche even praises federalism but, like many fellow
nationalists, common sense is adandoned once romanticism takes over.
Latouche argues that only a true political state will permit Quebec society to
extend to the apex of its potential as a fully pluralistic entity. The argument finds
its most complete and fullest expression in a 1993 work by Fernand Dumont one
of Quebec’s most respected scholars and former director of Le centre Québécois
de recherche sur la culture11. Dumont argues his nationalism in terms of a
"genesis" -a quasi-organic entity with a life entirely of its own. The "otherness" of
"les anglais" contrasted to the emerging realisation of being "French", a passage
from childhood to adolescence, a transition from homeland to country, a genesis
from a people to a nation.
For neo-nationalists such as Dumont, Quebec’s problem has been its
historic inability to find its collective identity as a nation. It has reached several
times for the elusive national identity and each time the collectivity has faltered.
This, Dumont argues, is the "vocation" (p. 235) of a people who pursued their
identity under the very eyes of the British Empire. Myths and legends built upon
myths and legends in the neo-nationalist world. The 1774 Quebec Act is seen as
clever victory for those with vision enough to see survival as the collective and
immediate goal. The rebellion of 1837 is re-interpreted away from a struggle for
responsible government to symbolise another act of defiance by the collectivity
against the cultural oppressor. Constructing nationalist myths continues to this
very day. A constitutional agreement by nine of ten provinces (not including
Quebec) in 1981, takes on the myth of the "night of the long knives" or "the stab
in the back". The myth conveniently overlooks the role -or lack, thereof- played by
Quebec’s the nationalist Premier René Levesque. While the Premier played cards
in his hotel room the other government leaders concluded a deal. While Quebec’s
Premier snuggled in bed the next morning, the other government leaders
announced their deal.
Another aspect of the contemporary debate in Quebec relates to a genuine
fear that the identity of French speaking persons will be submerged as the nature
of immigration changes. Quebec’s birthrate has fallen form 3.78 in 1951 to 1.43 in
1986. This constitutes one of the lowest birthrates in the world12 (Institut, 1989). A
1988 study commissioned by the Quebec Conseil de la langue française
concluded that the proportion of total Canadian population who would inhabit
Quebec would decline from 26.5% in 1981 to 24.1% by 2021. A fear of being
culturally submerged, a fear now being voiced by English-speaking Canadians as
larger numbers of non-European immigrants enter Canada, is much more acute
in a province wherein minority status has always been a way of life13. The irony is
that Quebec is now having enormous difficulties assimilating immigrants -much
the same experience that "British" Canada, historically, had trying to assimilate
French speaking inhabitants.
In many respects the contemporary debate in Canada is constitutional in
the first instance but, more fundamentally, it pertains very closely to the ongoing
historic struggle for cultural survival in the territory generally described as
Quebec14. As suggested above, the issue of cultural survival has never been
submerged in so far as concerns the French speaking community of Canada.
Fears now being expressed that the cultural onslaught is even more threatening
reflect much of the contemporary debate generally in Canada over immigration
and the impact upon traditional "Canadian" cultural values. A 1991 national
consultative inquiry into Canada’s future (Citizen’s Forum, 1991; 85-87) found
that Canadians were challenging concepts such as "multi-culturalism" as being
divisive:
Overwhelmingly, participants [in public consultation hearings] told us that
reminding us of our different origins is less useful in building a united country than
emphasizing the things we have in common...
Participants queried the focus on citizens' origins and celebrating heritage
cultures, rather than embracing a uniquely Canadian national character and
celebrating our Canadian heritage...
A great many participants see the funding of multi-culturalism programs as a
concrete example of the way in which government is encouraging divisiveness
through our diverse cultural origins, rather than fostering unity.
The theme of cultural submersion is an omnipresent theme not only in
Quebec but as well in English-speaking Canada. For French-speaking residents
of Quebec, the lure of recourse to nationalism is its attractiveness as a defensive
mode -a fortress- against assimilation, multi-culturalism and eventual
disappearance. For French culture to survive, the machinery of an identifiable
political state must be in place. The argument linking cultural survival to political
identity has been compelling these past few years.
CULTURAL PLURALISM: DIVERSITY WITHIN UNITY -THE FEDERAL
DILEMMA
Table1
Viewed from a linguistic perspective among the top 20 countries of origin,
roughly 125,000 immigrants were locations were English is a major spoken
language while fewer than 20,000 immigrants arrived from locations where
French is a major language -a ratio in excess of 6:1. Another 50,000, among the
top 20 countries of origin are from locations where neither of Canada’s official
languages is spoken although, unless an immigrant is a sponsored family
member, some minimum linguistic skill in either official language is pre-requisite
to immigration to Canada.
Another consideration is the radical and religious mix of immigrants.
Indeed, roughly 20% of the immigrants were from countries traditionally
associated with European culture, caucasian race and Christian religions.
Roughly 80% of the immigrants to Canada in 1993 were of non-traditional
religions and most were also non-caucasian. These proportions have been
roughly similar for the past 25 years. In the 1970’s the federal Government
responded with funded programmes designed to promote multi-culturalism.
School officials in major cities such as Vancouver and Toronto instituted
"heritage" programmes whereby students could receive formal credit for certain
types of studies in a heritage language of their preference. By 1990, for example,
the Toronto suburb of North York offered heritage language credit courses in
more than 54 languages. Various religious communities (e.g. Muslims, Sikhs) are
seeking official recognition of their religious schools as part of the formal
educational system.
Finally, an additional source of tension emerges when one considers
where immigrants from non-traditional Canadian sources choose to reside. Many,
emerging from urban areas themselves, take residence in Canada’s principle
urban centres (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Winnipeg). This accentuates an
already well entrenched historic alienation of rural and smaller community
residents from urban dwellers. Urban communities are perceived to be
considerably more culturally diverse than outlying and rural communities and the
sense "two cultural communities" -that of traditional values and cultures and that
of the recent immigrants- has taken on implied currency. The perception that
there is some coherence to the cultural onslaught of new arrivals in Canada is
belied by the diversity of ethnicities, religions and languages each of which seeks
both to preserve its unique qualities while simultaneously adding to the complex
fabric of late 20th Century Canada.
For the two "founding European cultures" (French and British) the same
sense of cultural challenge is present. But, for those of the British cultural
community -a community already diluted in cultural terms by over 100 years of
immigration from non-British (but largely European sources, Ukraine, Poland,
Iceland, Russia, Italy, Portugal, etc.)- a need to survive has never been a factor.
As the dominant culture in Canada and, in North America, the British (English
language) culture has never had to struggle.
For French speaking Canadians, however, cultural survival is an
embedded cultural norm. Historically, for example, in Quebec, the Roman
Catholic Church served, especially in rural communities, as a touchstone around
which survival of French language, culture and social values could be assembled.
"Had not Bishop Laflèche written that every person, every family, every society
had a place and a purpose in the divine scheme of the universe...? Thus, French
Canadians -it cannot be too often repeated- only need, in general, that
moderation of wealth an possessions which benefits their peaceful, honest and
virtuous character15".
However, as the influence of the Catholic Church declined, particularly
after the 1960’s, a new theocracy emerged, that of neo-nationalism.
Historically the Catholic Church served as a powerful intervenor on behalf
of traditional Franco-Canadienne values. It shielded French culture and gave that
founding community a base upon which political and, to a lesser extent economic,
power could be founded. Quebec’s "quiet revolution" of the 1960’s diminished
that intervening role for the Church and forced intellectuals and politicians in
Quebec to re-evaluate both their own political acumen and their role and
relationship with the other founding European community.
As early as the mid-1950’s, in a document known as the Tremblay
Report16 (Quebec, 1954), it was being vigorously argued that there were two
nations-two founding communities- united historically in a federal compact. The
implications of the Tremblay Commission Report were that the federation
"Canada" was a product of a contractual agreement between French speaking
and English speaking Canadians. The concept re-interpreted history and inverted,
by implication, the relationship between the federal government and the provinces
which is so clearly evident in the 1967 Constitution.
Given the scope of powers reserved to the federal government, plus the
large number of ensuing fiscal transfers from the federal government to the
provinces in the years after the 1867 Confederation, there can be no doubt that
the constitutional relationship was anything but a "compact" among equals. The
1867 Constitution is "colonial" in attitude; it posits the federal government in much
the same relationship to the provinces as the then British colonial government
had with its overseas colonies.
However, the enormous powers reserved to the federal government by that
1867 constitutional political deal does not erode the more critical issue of the
perceived equality of the two founding European cultures. Without exception
since 1867, Quebec’s political leaders have argued that Quebec -as a repository
of francophone culture in Canada- was an equal partner in the 1867 confederal
arrangement. That the partnership resulted in a disproportionate balance in power
between the central government and the provincial governments does not in any
manner undermine, or detract from, the essential political partnership deal of
1867. A political deal among political elites, equals in a entirely political
engagement -resulted in a asymmetrical constitutional division of powers. The
resulting constitutional asymmetry, ultimately was, and is, perceived by many
contemporary Quebec political and intellectual leaders to be threatening to the
continued cultural survival of the Quebec French speaking and cultural
community17.
Whether one views the contemporary sovereigniste movements in Quebec
as a from of cultural paranoia, as a political expedient, or as a legitimate concern
about the future of culture so long isolated from its historic roots as to easily
qualify today as a distinct culture, the fact remains that a large proportion of
Quebec’s current population appears willing to experiment with independence18.
In an effort to allay fears that Quebec’s version of nationalism will become
intolerant of other ethnic and cultural communities within an independent state,
quiet efforts are being made to assure groups -including native Canadians- that,
despite its pursuit of cultural sovereignty, an independent Quebec would be
pluralistic and tolerant of minority languages (e.g. English) and cultures.
Unfortunately, there is some reason to be concerned.
First, if the fundamental reason for Quebec’s pursuit of sovereignty is
"cultural survival", then any arguments for toleration and respect must be
shadowed by the very experience which has aroused the nationalist passion in
Quebec -the threat of multi-culturalism. Second, if experience in other recent
nationalist by-products is any example (e.g. Lativa, Lithuania, Estonia,
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstand and Turkmenistan) where nationality laws
have, or are becoming, obsessively nationalistic, the case for a Quebec founded
upon supra-nationalism does not bode entirely well for non-francophones19.
Third, while Quebec boasts its own Charter of Rights, there is no doubt that the
1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was widely perceived within
Quebec as an assault upon French language and culture. Thus, despite an over-
riding federal constitutional guarantee and a provincial assurance of freedom, in
practise an incumbent Government of Quebec in 1989 employed a provision of
the federal constitution in order to place a French language law above
constitutional protection. If that is the record under a Liberal Government
committed to some form of re-defined federal relationship, one might reasonable
wonder about the behaviour of a sovereignist Government propelled into power
on a tide of supranationalism.
In summary, it is difficult to imagine, however the disguise is designed, that
a political entity which achieves independence with the sole purpose of protecting
a cultural identity, can be tolerant in the long-run of those with whom history
associated their own diminished status. Nationalism, for whatever reason, has a
history of immense intolerance (Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 1988). But nationalism for
cultural, religious and linguistic purposes has an even more telling heritage
because such nationalism so readily drifts towards 'negativism' rather than
towards the higher purpose in which so many of its proponents place credance.
In the long-run, in terms of Quebec’s survival as an isolated cultural island
in Western hemispheric sea, it probably stands a much better chance of both
survival and fruition as a political, cultural and economic partner -the very status
independence would reject- in Canada. Both Quebec and Canada must learn to
benefit form their uneasy partnership while simultaneously adapting to the
globalisation of multi-culturalism which continues, relentlessly, to modify the host
societies. As many recent nationalists have yet to learn, there is little room on this
planet for culturally fortified islands.
CONCLUSION
Canada’s experiment with federalism continues. It has always been, and
doubtlessly will continue to be, a relationship founded upon political expediency. If
it is a partnership between the two funding European communities, then in every
constitutional and practical respect that partnership continues and is inviolable.
There is no reason for Quebec to assume that the validity of the original
partnership has been diminished by virtue of an influx of immigrants from non-
traditional and non-European sources. The federal Government has continuously
re-affirmed that partnership and, on three occasions in the past 20 years, sought
constitutionally to clarify and strengthen that partnership. Indeed, a 1969 Official
Languages Act sought to ensure availability of federal government services
throughout Canada. Unfortunately, outside Quebec the results are not hopeful.
Indeed, an estimated 196,087 students outside Quebec were enrolled in
elementary and secondary educational programmes. By 1993-1994, that number
had dropped to 159,377. Similarly, again outside Quebec, while the number of
Canadians whose "mother-tongue" is French actually rose between 1986 and
1991 (from 942,334 to 978,046) those who spoke French regularly at home
decreased form 686,000 (1986) to 634,000 (1991) while the population of Canada
increased substantially (StatsCan, 1994). For French speaking Canadians
outside Quebec, the issue of culture is significant and critical. "Exogamy", the
study of those who marry outside their language group, has become a vital
concern of non-Quebec resident francophones as an estimated 36% of
francophone women in the province of Ontario (aged 55-64 years) and 47%
(aged 25-34 years) married outside their francophone cultural communities (Gray,
1994).
Canadian society, to continue to be attractive as a community within which
to live and thrive, must constantly adapt. But adaptation certainly can not, and
should not, in any manner imply diminution of the fundamental premises upon
which the society was founded and from which it has matured. Tolerance and
respect for the rights and differences of individuals were overwhelming
"Canadian" identity characteristics proclaimed by large numbers of Canadians to
the 1991 Citizens' Forum on Canada’s Future. But tolerance must be coupled
with respect and therein lies the historic problem for many persons in Quebec. To
be perceived in numerous ways as "second-class" citizens within one’s own
country is intolerable.
Historically, those of the "dominant" culture (English language) and the
dominant religion (Anglican in particular and Protestantism in general) were also
largely dominant economically. The "British Empire", for which two World Wars,
an Anglo-Boer war and numerous other international incidents, were fought lent
symbolic support to the dominant culture. "The Motherland" (Great Britain) to
which Canadians in large numbers paid deference, was not a "motherland" for les
canadiennes. In many respects a global culture confronted an increasingly unique
but isolated culture.
In recent years the issue has not diminished, in practise it has been
exacerbated through continental free trade and increasing economic
globalisation. The North America Free Trade Agreement places French language
and culture in an even more precarious position because today the French
languages is the third language behind English and Spanish in the move towards
a continental and hemishpheric market20. In the long-run, the people of Quebec
will have to decide whether their language and culture can survive better
insulated from global and continental pressures by a tolerant -if not supportive-
official Canada or, as a cultural island increasingly surrounded by a less
hospitable English speaking community. The issue of federalism is extremely
important and while many Canadians outside Quebec assume that Canada’s
federal relationship should appear to be, and function as if it were, symmetrical, it
is highly improbable that anything less than formal asymmetry will both preserve
Quebec’s identity in general and its political relationship with Canada.
One the matter of asymmetry, it can be argued that from its inception
Canada has been a federal system founded upon the improbability of "fluctuating
asymmetry"21. Since Confederation in 1867, fiscal relationships have been
characterised by "special" (often virtually secret) deals between provincial
governments and the federal government. Provincial populations were regularly
inflated in the 19th Century in order to ensure that, on a per capita basis,
provinces received sufficient funds to maintain their viability. In fact, in 1907, the
Constitution was amended and a formula inserted to guarantee that the province
of British Columbia would receive funding form the federal Government
equivalent to an existing population even if that population diminished. That
same type of formula emerged in both the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the
1992 Charlottetown Accord in respect to Quebec. Unlike 1907, however, the
debates were public and in the end the formulas failed.
Quebec will conduct a referendum in 1995 on sovereignty. A Bill already
has been tabled in the National Assembly of Quebec. This year, therefore, marks
the turning point not only in terms of Quebec’s relationship with Canada but in a
more global sense, with the future and fate of French language and culture in
North America.
I have no doubt that the French language and culture will survive in North
America22. The question people in Quebec ultimately must face is whether their culture can
thrive and provide them with the dignity of cultural identity. In my personal view, the
interaction of the two founding European cultures is the unique quality of Canada. Like the
Swiss, I very much doubt that the uniqueness which is "Canadian" would benefit from a
diminution in status or dignity of either of the founding cultures. Multiculturalism will change
and enhance Canada but the virtues of multiculturalism should not depreciate, in the long-
run, the fundamental values of that unique cultural flavour so enjoyed by so many
Canadians. Quebec stands uniquely poised to benefit from a vigorous pursuit of its cultural
identity but its ultimate strength will rest in its continued association with a Canada -even
one struggling to posit bilingualism- than as an island culture into itself.
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